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SEEKING A REGULATORY CHILL IN
CANADA: THE DOW AGROSCIENCES
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 CHALLENGE TO
THE QUÉBEC PESTICIDES
MANAGEMENT CODE
Kathleen Cooper, * Kyra Bell-Pasht, ** Ramani Nadarajah, ***
& Theresa McClenaghan ****
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, during the heated public debate before its
passage, and in the years following, many legal experts warned of the
threat posed by the North American Free Trade Agreement 1 (NAFTA) to
Canadian public interest policies. 2 These warnings focused on two
*
Kathleen Cooper graduated from the University of Toronto in 1984 with a specialist degree in
Environmental Studies. Since 1987 Cooper has been with the Canadian Environmental Law
Association (CELA), where she is Senior Researcher and a paralegal. At CELA, Cooper has written
extensively about the associations between toxic substances and children’s health.
**
Kyra Bell-Pasht was called to the Ontario Bar in 2012 and was Counsel to CELA during 20 12-13.
***
Ramani Nadarajah holds an LLB (1987) and an LLM (2007) in Administrative Law. Since 1994
Nadarajah has been counsel with CELA, where she represents clients on public interest
environmental cases before the courts and administrative tribunals. Prior to joining CELA,
Nadarajah was a prosecutor with the Ontario Ministry of Environment.
****
Theresa McClenaghan holds an LLB (1984), an LLM in Constitutional Law (1999), and a
diploma in Environmental Health (1999). McClenaghan is a Bar member of Manitoba and Ontario
and has practiced public interest environmental law, both in private practice since 1985 and at CELA
as counsel since 1998, and as Executive Director at CELA since 2007.
The authors dedicate this Article to the hundreds of environmental and public health activists across
Canada whose perseverance over many years has fundamentally changed the relationship that many
Canadians have with the environment around their homes and in their communities, and whose
efforts have eliminated needless exposure to pesticides for the benefit of present and future
generations and the environment. The authors also wish to acknowledge Rizwan Khan, student-atlaw at CELA, for research assistance on this Article.
1
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2
See, e.g., PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
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overall concerns with NAFTA’s Chapter 11 dealing with Investment and
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. First, Chapter
11 grants foreign “investors”—that is foreign-based corporations
operating in Canada—wide-reaching, quasi-constitutional commercial
rights. 3 Second, despite health and environmental safeguards in
NAFTA’s preamble and Chapter 11 itself, the rights granted to investors
would be interpreted and applied by internationally established,
commercially focused tribunals. Therein, additional key aspects of
Chapter 11 would be applied that provide for over-arching investor
rights. Moreover, these tribunals would operate outside of the Canadian
judicial system’s existing public-interest and procedural safeguards, and
could therefore allow bias in favour of foreign investors over the intent
of both domestic law and public aspirations for legal reform. 4
Concurrent with the NAFTA debate during the early 1990s, a
unique step was taken in a small Québec town spawning a powerful
grassroots movement across Canada. In 1991, following several years of
citizen-led actions seeking reductions in pesticide use, a municipal bylaw passed by Hudson, Québec, banned the cosmetic use of pesticides on
private property. The term “cosmetic” refers to pesticide use solely for
the purpose of influencing the appearance of lawns or gardens. It is also
referred to as non-essential or unnecessary use. The Hudson by-law was
challenged in Spraytech v. Hudson, which culminated ten years later in a
landmark Supreme Court of Canada ruling upholding the by-law. 5
After the Hudson decision, dozens of Hudson-style by-laws were
passed across Canada limiting the cosmetic use of pesticides. 6 Québec
continued to lead the effort against cosmetic pesticide use, passing
legislation banning cosmetic pesticide use in 2003 that targeted certain

UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 26, 65 (1996); JOHN J.
AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 39 (1997); Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's
Ecological Footprints, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 198-99 (1998).
3
See, e.g., Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a
Sovereign's Power To Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 115-22 (1999).
4
See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Canadian Constitutionalism and Sovereignty After
NAFTA, 5 CONST. F. 93, 94-98 (1994); Charles E. Reasons, NAFTA and Inequality: A Canadian
Perspective, 5 CONST. F. 72, 74 (1994); Swenarchuk, supra note 2, at 201, 208-14; see also Michael
W. Dunleavy, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental Protection and NAFTA, 51 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 204, 235-39 (1993).
5
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
241 (Can.).
6
MIKE CHRISTIE, PRIVATE PROPERTY PESTICIDE BY-LAWS IN CANADA: POPULATION
STATISTICS
BY
MUNICIPALITY
(Dec.
31,
2010),
available
at
www.flora.org/healthyottawa/BylawList.pdf.
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pesticides and pesticide uses province-wide. 7 Ontario followed in 2008 8
with a more comprehensive province-wide cosmetic pesticide ban that
prohibited the use and sale of hundreds of pesticide products while
retaining the ability to use pesticides for, among other reasons, public
health and agriculture protection. Currently, additional municipal bylaws or provincial laws focused on curtailing the cosmetic use of
pesticides are in place or the subject of active debate across the country.
In 2008, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor rights provisions intersected
with this twenty-year effort to limit cosmetic pesticide use. Dow
AgroSciences (Dow), a United States-based chemical manufacturer, gave
notice that it would challenge the Québec Pesticides Management Code 9
arguing that Canada was in breach of the minimum standard of treatment
and expropriation provisions of Chapter 11. These provisions, and
subsequent sections of Chapter 11, 10 allow companies to sue countries if
their expected returns on investment are reduced by government actions.
Dow sought $2 million in compensation, based on an alleged lack of due
process in the passage of Québec’s law and damage to its investment in
Canada. 11 Notably, the Dow claim was focused on its commercial
interest in a single pesticide, 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D).
Though 2,4-D was among the pesticides heavily used for cosmetic
purposes, the Québec law and many local by-laws in Québec and across
Canada, as well as other provincial statutes, had to do with many more
pesticides.
The Dow case was largely unsuccessful either in influencing the
Québec by-law or in its widely understood purpose: to create a
regulatory chill on further pesticide bans across Canada. Nevertheless, it
is a valuable case study of how investors can attempt to use their rights
under NAFTA to thwart the intent of existing laws or to undermine the
passage of similar laws elsewhere in the same jurisdiction.
Lastly, the precautionary principle, which also had its beginnings in
the 1980s and early 1990s, developed rapidly at the international level
and in domestic legislation in many countries. 12 Notably, the Dow claim
under Chapter 11 challenged the validity of Québec’s application of the
7

Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.).
Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11 (Can.).
9
Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.).
10
NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1105, 1110, 1116-1117.
11
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Trade Agreement (Aug. 25,
2008),
available
at
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/dow-01.pdf.
12
Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of
Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 223-35 (1997).
8
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precautionary principle. 13 This Article addresses the contrast between the
Dow claim within NAFTA’s narrow focus on commercial interests and
the broader lens of longstanding and widespread public support in
Canada for a precautionary response to cosmetic pesticide use.
II.

COSMETIC PESTICIDE BANS IN CANADA

A.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

From the mid-1980s onward, a reliable sign of spring for the legal
intake staff at the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA)
was calls from the public about the spraying of pesticides in schools,
parks, and playgrounds. 14 Typical callers were young mothers who saw
this spraying as needlessly creating health risks for their children. The
concerned mothers would ask why the spraying of pesticides was
allowed and how they could stop it. 15 CELA helped these parents
organize deputations to school boards, municipal parks departments, and
municipal councils. In a more direct approach, one young mother
requested the spraying schedule from the City of Toronto Parks
Department in order to avoid the spraying since it made her children
cough. When the trucks arrived at the park, the mother had the entrance
blockaded with strollers.
As a result of many such efforts in Ontario and other provinces,
slow but steady change occurred with many parks departments, school
boards, and even entire municipalities agreeing to reduce or eliminate
pesticide use on public lands. These efforts often focused on playgrounds
or other areas used by children. In Québec, these changes increasingly
occurred via municipal by-laws, as discussed further below.
Optimistically named “the turnaround decade,” the 1990s dawned
as a time of tremendous hope for addressing environmental problems. 16
In the build-up to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, often incomplete but very
troubling scientific evidence continued to mount about many
13

Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Intent, ¶ 7.
Statistical tracking of legal intake and summary advice calls and emails at CELA (as
required as one condition of funding from Legal Aid Ontario) during the late 1980s and through the
1990s indicates dozens of calls per year about pesticide spraying in parks and schools, and on urban
lawns, beginning in April. This is one of the most common issues raised in intake requests and
provides a rationale for focusing on pesticide issues in CELA’s organizational strategic planning.
15
Our colleagues at the Sierra Legal Defense Fund, now Ecojustice Canada, and at the
Toronto Environmental Alliance, can recall similar heralds of spring in Canada.
16
See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
14
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environmental woes. The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development 17 contained twenty-seven lofty principles about moving
towards a more sustainable and equitable world, with Principle 15
focused on applying a precautionary approach in response to scientific
uncertainty.
Also during the late 1980s and early 1990s, regulatory action was
being taken in Canada and many other countries on a few highly toxic
substances, often in response to evidence about cancer risks. These
actions notably included progressively phasing out several
organochlorine pesticides that would go on to dominate the first list of
toxic substances named under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants. 18 Adding to the evidence about these notorious
pesticides, rapidly growing literature indicated greater vulnerability in
children to a much longer list of pesticides. These child health risks were
comprehensively documented in a landmark U.S. National Research
Council study 19 that influenced an overhaul of pesticide regulation in the
United States and countries worldwide, including Canada.
Another emerging area of scientific research was endocrine
disruption, a term that originated from a multidisciplinary meeting held
in 1991 among experts in the fields of anthropology, ecology,
comparative endocrinology, histopathology, immunology, mammalogy,
medicine, law, psychiatry, psychoneuroendocrinology, reproductive
physiology, toxicology, wildlife management, tumor biology, and
zoology. A statement issued at the meeting raised alarm bells about
reproductive and other health risks that might result from prenatal
exposure to toxic substances, including pesticides. 20 Going well beyond
the primary focus on cancer that then dominated regulatory toxicology,
this rapidly expanding body of research was later summarized in the
book Our Stolen Future 21 as it continues to be summarized online 22 and
17

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I),
Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf151261annex1.htm.
18
UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT
ORGANIC POLLUTANTS,
Annex
A,
at
21
(May
22,
2001),
available
at
www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf.
19
COMM. ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS & CHILDREN ET AL., PESTICIDES IN THE
DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 359-63 (1993).
20
H. BERN ET AL., STATEMENT FROM THE WORK SESSION ON CHEMICALLY-INDUCED
ALTERATIONS IN SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT: THE WILDLIFE/HUMAN CONNECTION 1 (1992), available
at endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/wingspread_consensus_statement.pdf.
21
THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY,
INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996).
22
OUR STOLEN FUTURE, www.ourstolenfuture.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
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extensively in scientific literature. 23 This early recognition of endocrine
disrupting chemicals initiated concerns about chronic low-level
exposures to mixtures of chemicals. Currently, these concerns remain
matters of extreme scientific complexity and challenge in the regulatory
assessment of toxic substances 24 and consistently underscore public calls
for reducing chemical exposures whenever possible.
It was in this context of Rio-inspired optimism for precautionary
policy change and the expanding scientific evidence of cancer and other
chemical exposure health risks that many Canadians supported the ban of
cosmetic pesticide use.
B.

HUDSON, QUÉBEC: THE MOUSE THAT ROARED 25

In 1991, the Town of Hudson, Québec, adopted By-law 270, 26
which restricted the use of pesticides within its perimeter to specific
locations and enumerated uses, and imposed fines ranging from $100 to
$4,000 for its violation. 27 The by-law allowed continued, but limited
pesticide use. For example, pesticides could be used by farmers or to
protect public health. 28 But the by-law essentially banned pesticides for
cosmetic uses in landscaping and lawn care. 29 The by-law was passed in
response to public concerns regarding safety and the adverse effects of
pesticide use. 30
In 1992, the municipality charged two landscaping companies,

23

See, e.g., Evanthia Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals: An
Endocrine Society Scientific Statement, 30 ENDOCRINE REV. 293 (2009); R. Thomas Zoeller et al.,
Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals and Public Health Protection: A Statement of Principles from the
Endocrine Society, 2012 ENDOCRINOLOGY 4097; WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE-DISRUPTING CHEMICALS 2012 (Åke Bergman
et al. eds., 2013), available at www.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78101/1/9789241505031_eng.pdf.
24
ANDREAS KORTENCAMP ET AL., STATE OF THE ART REPORT ON MIXTURE TOXICITY:
FINAL REPORT 7-165 (Dec. 22, 2009); European Parliament Resolution of 14 March 2013 on the
Protection of Public Health from Endocrine Disrupters, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2013)0091 (2013).
25
LEONARD WIBBERLEY, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (1955). This Cold War satirical novel
prompted further satirical works in the same genre and ongoing usage of the book title to
characterize David-and-Goliath-type political struggles.
26
HUDSON, QUE., BY-LAW 270 (1991) (Can.).
27
Id. art. 11.
28
Id. art. 3.
29
Id. art. 2.
30
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
241, ¶ 6 (Can.) (“The by-law responded to residents’ concerns, repeatedly expressed since 1985.”);
id. ¶ 13 (“[T]he by-law was enacted by the Town in the public interest and in response to health
concerns expressed by residents. The court noted that these concerns were recorded in the Town
Council’s meeting minutes and manifested themselves in letters to Council, as well as a petition with
more than 300 signatures.”).
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Spraytech and Chemlawn, with unpermitted use of pesticides in
contravention of the by-law. 31 The companies plead not guilty and asked
the court to declare the by-law outside the Town’s authority. 32 The
Québec Superior Court denied the companies’ motion for a declaratory
judgment and upheld the validity of the by-law, 33 and the Québec Court
of Appeal affirmed the ruling. 34 Nearly ten years after the by-law was
enacted, the two landscaping companies appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada. 35
A notable difference between the Hudson by-law and other efforts
to control pesticide use was that the Hudson by-law included private
property. Hudson’s power to create the by-law derived from the Québec
Cities and Towns Act. 36 Indeed, by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, over thirty-five similar municipal by-laws existed
elsewhere in Québec. The very strong public sentiment in favour of these
by-laws was epitomized in a high-profile campaign led by an articulate
young cancer survivor, Jean-Dominic Lévesque-René. Diagnosed with
Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in 1994, Jean-Dominic spent his childhood
and teenage years alongside many other activists in town hall meetings,
organizing protests, and lobbying municipalities and provincial officials
to ban cosmetic pesticide use. 37
These actions, mostly by small municipalities in Québec, prompted
the Toronto Environmental Alliance to seek CELA’s advice as to
whether similar powers existed in Ontario. A generic opinion 38 prepared
in 1999 confirmed that Ontario municipalities had similar powers to pass
pesticide control by-laws under the provincial Municipal Act. 39
Bolstered by this opinion, health and environmental organizations
stepped up their lobbying efforts in many Ontario municipalities. While
the organizations encountered sympathetic ears among many politicians,
the oft-repeated response was the fear of lawsuits and the need to wait
31

Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
33
Id. ¶ 10.
34
Id. ¶ 13.
35
Id. ¶ 1.
36
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-19 (Can.).
37
Michelle Lalonde, Pesticide Fight Heads for Top Court: Lawn-Care Firms Challenging
Municipal Ban on Controversial Chemicals, THE MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2000, at A1.
38
Theresa McClenaghan, Ontario Municipal Pesticide By-Laws: Preliminary Legal Opinion
for the Toronto Environmental Alliance (1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with authors); see also
Theresa McClenaghan, Bill 111—Ontario’s New Municipal Act and Pesticide By-law Powers, 26
INTERVENOR (2001), available at www.cela.ca/article/hudson-quebec-pesticide-law/bill-111ontarios-new-municipal-act-and-pesticide-law-powers.
39
Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 (Can.).
32
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for the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on the Hudson by-law.
CELA’s later intervention in the Hudson case before the Supreme Court
was primarily directed to bringing the implications of the case for other
provinces to the Court’s attention. 40
C.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S DECISION IN HUDSON

In 2001, a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the trial and appellate courts’ determination that the by-law was
valid. 41 Multiple aspects of the Hudson decision are relevant to this
Article’s discussion of issues that arose in the Dow claim against the
Québec Pesticides Management Code under Chapter 11. These aspects
range from the procedural access and rights accorded to multiple
interveners to the substantive and obiter reasons given by the Court.
1.

Procedural Fairness

The Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada provide that any party
may bring a motion for leave to intervene before a judge. 42 The test for
intervention is set out in Rule 57, which provides that an intervention
must be relevant, useful, and different from those of the other parties. 43
Essentially, the Supreme Court is looking to public interest interveners to
help in the development of legal principles. 44 Interveners can assist the
Court by explaining how a particular legal issue has implications in the
broader public policy context and its potential to impact decisions in
other cases or circumstances, which extend beyond the appeal before the
Court. 45 Interveners can also aid the Court by bringing a group’s
expertise and special knowledge to bear on a particular legal issue. 46 The
Court grants most applications for leave to intervene. 47 Once intervention
40

TORONTO ENVTL. ALLIANCE ET AL., FACTUM OF THE INTERVENERS (Sept. 2000),
available at s.cela.ca/files/uploads/ff_hudson.pdf.
41
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
241 (Can.).
42
Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, 55-59 (Can.), amended by
SOR/2011-74 (applicable to intervention and governing motions for leave to intervene) (Can.); see
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 (Can.) (the enabling statute).
43
Rules of the Supreme Court of Canda, SOR/2002-156. 57 (Can.), amended by SOR/201174 (Can.); see Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 (Can.) (the enabling statute).
44
Emily White, The Art of Intervention, 21 NAT’L 27, 29 (2012), available at
www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/October-November-2012/The-art-of-intervention.aspx.
45
Benjamin R.D. Alarie & Andrew J. Green, Interventions Before the Supreme Court of
Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 381, 400 (2010).
46
White, supra note 44, at 29.
47
Alarie & Green, supra note 45, at 400.
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has been granted, an intervener is allowed to file a brief factum and make
an appearance before the Supreme Court at the case hearing.48
CELA sought to intervene on its own behalf and also represented
one individual and nine other groups ranging from community-based
citizens groups to national organizations. 49 The Sierra Legal Defence
Fund (SLDF), a national environmental organization now known as
Ecojustice Canada, also intervened on behalf of the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities, World Wildlife Fund Canada, and NatureAction Québec Incorporated. CELA and SLDF collaborated closely so as
to raise a complementary set of issues with the Court.
2.

Substantive and Obiter Reasons for Denying the Appeal

The appellants in Hudson argued that the by-law was invalid and
ultra vires on the grounds that it was not authorized under provincial
enabling legislation, and it conflicted with federal and provincial laws
related to pesticides. 50 Concerning the power delegated to municipalities
to pass by-laws, the appellants argued that this delegated authority did
not include the power to regulate the use of pesticides. 51
CELA’s amicus brief argued for the government’s ability to
legislate and create by-laws because these “are political activities, carried
out by the elected representatives, based upon community concerns and
standards, balancing a number of competing interests,” in contrast to the
appellant’s argument that such measures had to be “wise scientific
decisions.” 52 The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments advanced by
CELA and SLDF that the municipality legitimately relied upon the
“general welfare” powers under Section 410 of the Cities and Towns
Act, noting these more open-ended provisions “allow municipalities to
respond expeditiously to new challenges facing local communities,
without requiring amendment of the provincial enabling legislation.”53
Because such general grants of power are not accompanied by more
specific grants (there being none in the Cities and Towns Act relating to
48

Id. at 383.
The interveners represented by CELA were the Canadian Environmental Law Association,
Toronto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, Parents’ Environmental Network, Healthy
Lawns–Healthy People, Pesticide Action Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers
of the Urban Use of Pesticides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast Cancer Prevention Coalition,
Vaughan Environmental Action Committee, and one individual, Dr. Merryl Hammond.
50
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R.
241, ¶¶ 7, 17, 24, 34 (Can.).
51
Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 17, 34.
52
TORONTO ENVTL. ALLIANCE ET AL., supra note 40, ¶ 26.
53
See Hudson, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 19.
49
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pesticide use), the issue for the Court was whether general welfare
provisions, absent a specific grant, could authorize By-law 270. 54
The Supreme Court found that such open-ended provisions could
indeed authorize by-laws outside of any specific grant of powers but
noted as a limitation that the issue “must be closely related to the
immediate interests of the community within [its] territorial limits” and
agreed that this was the case for a by-law that concerned the use and
protection of the local environment within the community. 55 Moreover,
further concurring with arguments raised in CELA’s amicus brief, the
Supreme Court noted that similar by-law making powers exist in seven
other provinces.
To the issue of the appellant’s claim of conflict with provincial or
federal statutes, throughout the decision, the Supreme Court again
echoed the arguments advanced by CELA and SLDF. 56 The Supreme
Court noted that federal pesticide legislation provides a registration
process to address the import, export, manufacture, sale, packaging, and
labeling of pesticides in Canada. 57 At the provincial level, pesticide law
regulates permitting and licensing of vendors and commercial applicators
or pesticides. 58 The municipal by-law was narrowly focused and imposed
restrictions on pesticide application use within a specific geographic
locale by applying legitimate powers to enact by-laws for the “general
welfare” of the community in response to local challenges and
concerns. 59 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Hudson by-law did
not occupy the same field as the provincial and federal regulatory
framework. 60 Indeed, the court found that the by-law was in fact
complementary to federal and provincial law and observed that, “[a]long
with By-law 270, these laws establish a tri-level regulatory regime.” 61
In concluding its discussion on statutory interpretation, the Supreme
Court accepted SLDF’s argument that the preventative approach taken
by the Town of Hudson to restrict the non-essential use of pesticides was
consistent with the precautionary principle. 62 Noting the work of
54

Id. ¶ 52.
Id. ¶¶ 53-54.
56
Id. ¶¶ 18-20, 22-24, 27, 30, 35-39, 44-46, 48-49; see also JERRY V. DEMARCO, ASSESSING
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS, 30 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 299, 321-24 (2005).
57
Hudson, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 35.
58
Id. ¶¶ 36, 39.
59
Id. ¶¶ 3, 23, 26-27, 49.
60
Id. ¶ 31.
61
Id. ¶ 39.
62
Id. ¶ 31.
55
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multiple scholars, 63 the Supreme Court stated in obiter, “there may be
currently sufficient state practice to allow a good argument that the
precautionary principle is a principle of customary international law.” 64
Additionally, the Supreme Court noted, “in the context of the
precautionary principle’s tenets, the Town’s concerns about pesticides fit
well under their rubric of preventive action.” 65
The Hudson decision exemplifies how public interest interveners
can provide important assistance to the courts. The Supreme Court has
explicitly acknowledged this influential role, 66 and it has been
established qualitatively and quantitatively in an analysis of several cases
before the Supreme Court between 1992 and 2004, including Hudson. 67
The analysis showed that the Supreme Court rarely indicates which
aspects of its decisions interveners influence. 68 However, by carefully
reviewing the full range of written interventions and supporting
authorities and then comparing these materials to the Supreme Court’s
decisions, this analysis shows a profound influence. For example, the
Supreme Court primarily relied upon those authorities introduced by the
main parties, as would be expected. 69 However, for those authorities
uniquely introduced by public interest interveners across seven different
cases, the author noted that “[r]egardless of the reasons, it is quite clear
that, judged from the perspective of unique authorities, interveners have
indeed kept their promise of introducing useful and different submissions
and have added immense value to the Court’s jurisprudence.” 70
D.

HUDSON-STYLE BY-LAWS PROLIFERATE ACROSS CANADA

The Hudson case was hailed as a major victory by environmental,
health, and community groups. 71 Following the Supreme Court decision,
63

JAMES CAMERON & JULI ABOUCHAR, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in
International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (David
Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); McIntyre & Mosedale, supra note 12.
64
See Hudson, 2 S.C.R. 241, ¶ 32 (quoting CAMERON & ABOUCHAR, supra note 63, at 3031).
65
Id. ¶ 32.
66
Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Emp’t & Immigration), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 236, ¶ 43 (“Public interests organizations are, as they should be, frequently granted intervener
status. The views and submissions of interveners on issues of public importance frequently provide
great assistance to the courts.”).
67
DEMARCO, supra note 56, at 330.
68
Id. at 301.
69
Id. at 310.
70
Id. at 311.
71
CANADIAN ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, VICTORY FOR PESTICIDE REDUCTION AND LOCAL
DEMOCRACY (June 28, 2001), available at www.cela.ca/newsevents/media-release/victory-
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municipalities across the country were faced with a rise of public
demand to enact similar pesticide by-laws. Many did so increasingly in
larger cities. For example, Toronto undertook a scientific literature
review and extensive public consultation that culminated in a Hudsonstyle by-law in 2003. After reviewing the evidence about pesticide
risks, 72 Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health supported a by-law
concluding with language grounded in a precautionary approach that
“when risks to human health are unnecessary or uncertain, the wisest
course of action is to substitute safer alternatives and methods, rather
than incurring risks that may prove unacceptable in the long run.” 73 The
involvement and support of progressive voices in the medical profession,
from local physicians to officials in public health departments, to
provincial and national organizations, was highly influential in the local
and provincial campaigns that occurred following the Supreme Court
ruling.
A strategic choice was made in numerous municipalities to avoid
the chance of lawsuits and strictly follow the Hudson model. Toronto
confirmed the wisdom of this approach when CropLife Canada, an
association representing pesticide manufacturers, filed a lawsuit
challenging the by-law. However, echoing the Québec Superior and
Appeal Courts in Hudson, the Ontario Superior Court 74 and the Ontario
Court of Appeal 75 up-held Toronto’s by-law under Ontario’s Municipal
Act, citing the Supreme Court decision in Hudson. CropLife sought leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, but its application was
dismissed given that the issues to be addressed were substantially similar
to those in Hudson. 76 At present, there are over 170 pesticide by-laws in
effect across Canada with more being actively discussed. 77
E.

PROVINCE-WIDE BANS IN QUÉBEC AND ONTARIO
Québec continued in the frontline of this movement. As a result of

pesticide-reduction-and-local-democracy.
72
TORONTO PUB. HEALTH, LAWN AND GARDEN PESTICIDES: A REVIEW OF HUMAN
EXPOSURE
&
HEALTH
EFFECTS
RESEARCH
(Apr.
2002),
available
at
www.toronto.ca/health/pesticides/pdf/pesticides_lawnandgarden.pdf.
73
TORONTO PUB. HEALTH, PLAYING IT SAFE: HEALTHY CHOICES ABOUT LAWN CARE
PESTICIDES 1 (Apr. 2002), available at www.toronto.ca/health/hphe/pdf/playingitsafe.pdf.
74
Croplife Canada v. Toronto (2003), 68 O.R. 3d 520 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
75
Croplife Canada v. Toronto (2005), 75 O.R. 3d 357, aff'd, (2003) 68 O.R. 3d 520 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).
76
Croplife Canada v. Toronto (2005), 75 O.R. 3d 357, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
31036 (Nov. 17, 2005) (Can.).
77
CHRISTIE, supra note 6, at 1.
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extensive public consultation beginning in 1998, Québec passed
legislation banning certain pesticide uses on a province-wide basis. 78 The
Pesticides Management Code, 79 enacted in 2003 but not implemented
until 2006, prohibited the use and sale of thirteen active ingredients in
insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides then typically used in lawn care,
and specified a list of low-risk bio-pesticides allowed for use inside and
outside child care centers and elementary and secondary schools. 80 As
under the Hudson-style by-laws, golf courses were exempt, but
requirements were put in place for them to develop pesticide reduction
plans. 81
Québec devised a screening method to decide which pesticides to
include that involved comparing pesticides commonly used in lawn care
with lists of chemicals associated with cancer or endocrine disruption.
Regarding 2,4-D specifically, all forms of this pesticide were included in
the ban because, as one of the chlorophenoxy herbicides, it had been
classified as a possible human carcinogen by the International Agency
for Research on Cancer. 82
The main reason for the ban was to limit the harmful effects of
pesticides on human health—especially on the health of children—and
on the environment. This rationale flowed from the March 2002
recommendations of the Groupe de réflexionsur les pesticides en milieu
urbain, a focus group organized to consolidate the results of public
consultation and mandated to address means of reducing pesticide use for
green space maintenance. 83 Their recommendations derived from two
guiding principles—precaution and exemplary behavior. They noted that
precaution was necessary since the toxicity of pesticides has yet to be
thoroughly studied and thus they must be used carefully. Exemplary
behavior would help contribute to changing habits through pesticide
management in urban environments.
Québec officials also pointed to biomonitoring results in Québec
children that showed ninety-eight percent of all children carried
pesticides in their bodies from various sources (e.g. food, water), but
78

The
Pesticides
Management
Code,
GOV’T
OF
QUÉBEC,
www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/pesticides/permis-en/code-gestion-en/#why (last updated Mar. 2011).
79
Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.).
80
Id. arts. 25-26, 31-33, scheds. I-II.
81
Id. arts. 73-74.
82
INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, AGENTS CLASSIFIED BY THE IARC
16,
2013),
available
at
MONOGRAPHS
11
(July
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/ClassificationsAlphaOrder.pdf.
83
GROUPE DE REFLEXIONSUR LES PESTICIDES EN MILIEU URBAIN, RAPPORT [REPORT] Mar.
2002 (Can.), available at www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/pesticides/reflexion/rapport-pesticide.pdf. Note
this document is only available in French.
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found lawn-care herbicides only in those children living in municipalities
without a pesticide ban. 84 More generally, the precautionary foundation
of the Québec law derived from the opinion of public health experts who
stated in an earlier report from the Québec National Public Health
Institute that based on “data which are presently available, the fact that
certain aspects remain poorly understood, and the increased vulnerability
of certain groups provide ample reason to justify taking a prudent
approach and applying the precautionary principle with respect to
pesticide use.” 85
In 2007, a newly elected Liberal government in Ontario confirmed
an election promise that it was committed to enacting legislation for a
province-wide ban on cosmetic pesticide use. Calling for this law was a
broad-based coalition of health and environmental organizations,86 many
of whom had documented the greater risk to children from pesticides, 87
including a comprehensive literature review by the Ontario College of
Family Physicians. 88 Repeated opinion polling 89 showed overwhelming
public support for the ban, and after two years of extensive public
consultation Ontario passed the most comprehensive legislation in North
America. The law was passed in June 2008 but slated for proclamation in

84

CARACTÉRISATION DE L’EXPOSITION AUX PESTICIDES UTILISÉS EN MILIEU RESIDENTIAL
QUÉBÉCOIS AGES DE 3 Â 7 ANS [CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPOSURE TO
PESTICIDES USED IN RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS IN QUÉBEC CHILDREN AGES 3 TO 7 YEARS] Aug.
2004
(Can.),
available
at
www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publications/319CaracterisationPesticidesEnfants.pdf. Note this document is only available in French.
85
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE SANTE PUBLIQUE DU QUÉBEC, THOUGHTS ON URBAN USE
PESTICIDES
8
(Dec.
2001),
available
at
www.inspq.qc.ca/pdf/publications/206ThoughtsOnUrbanUsePesticides.pdf.
86
CANADIAN ASS’N OF PHYSICIANS FOR THE ENV’T ET AL., HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORT ONTARIO-WIDE BAN ON COSMETIC PESTICIDES (Jan. 2008), available at
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/ONPesticideBanStatement.pdf.
87
CHILDREN’S HEALTH PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD SETTING AND CHILDREN’S
HEALTH (May 25, 2000), available at s.cela.ca/pdf/CHP.pdf.
88
THE ONTARIO COLL. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF PESTICIDE HUMAN
HEALTH EFFECTS 167-69 (Apr. 23, 2004), available at www.ocfp.on.ca/docs/pesticidespaper/pesticides-paper.pdf?sfvrsn=1.
89
See, e.g., Press Release, Can. Ass’n of Physicians for the Envt., As Gov’t Prepares Regs,
Health and Enviro Groups Want End to Spraying (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/MR080904_pesticidepoll.pdf; ORACLE POLL RESEARCH, SURVEY REPORT
(Feb.
2007),
available
at
www.flora.org/healthyottawa/PFO%20CAPE%20Ont%20Poll%202007.pdf. Numerous additional
polls were conducted in Ontario municipalities during debates about pesticide by-laws, with results
consistently showing 70% and higher levels of support for bans on cosmetic pesticide use. Results of
additional polls with similar results conducted at the municipal or provincial level from across
Canada are summarized on the Coalition for Healthy Ottawa’s website. Pesticide Polls and Surveys
Across Canada, THE COALITION FOR A HEALTHY OTTAWA, www.flora.org/healthyottawa/pesticideban-public-opinion-poll.htm (last updated May 24, 2012).
CHEZ DES ENFANTS
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the following year after the creation of implementing regulations. It came
into force on Earth Day, April 22, 2009, banning the use and sale of
hundreds of pesticides end-use products. The Ontario legislation stayed
within the Hudson by-law model of an overall ban with exceptions to
allow the use of pesticides for limited reasons such as public health
protection, 90 and to allow for phased pesticide reduction on golf
courses. 91
F.

THE RE-EVALUATION OF 2,4-D

The Québec 92 and Ontario 93 bans included the pesticide 2,4-D, in all
its various end-product uses for lawn care. During the three-year
implementation phase for the Québec law lasting from 2003 to 2006, the
province committed to review its inclusion of 2,4-D in light of its
ongoing re-evaluation, 94 which began in 2004 95 by the Pest Management
Regulatory Agency (PMRA), a department of Health Canada responsible
for pesticide registration.
In May 2008, PMRA finalized its re-evaluation process and allowed
the continued sale and use of certain products containing 2,4-D,
including those used for lawn and turf. 96 Revisions to label requirements
addressed worker health and safety issues as well as environmental
releases. 97 The decision also included a data call-in requirement for a
developmental neurotoxicity study and a multi-generation reproductive
study, and noted “additional protective measures have been incorporated

90

Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, art. 7.1 (Can.).
Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, arts. 7.1(2), 35(1) (Can.); Pesticides Act, R.O. 63/09,
arts.18-20 (Can.).
92
Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.).
93
Pesticides Act, R.O. 63/09, arts. 4(5), 16 (Can.); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T,
at
CLASS
9
PESTICIDES
1
(June
28,
2013),
available
www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@category/@pesticides/documents/nativedocs/
stdprod_080203.pdf.
94
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 29
(Mar. 31, 2009), available at www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Dow/Dow-Canada-NOA.pdf
(“In the March 5, 2003 news release announcing the Code, Québec stated that: Due to the continuing
uncertainty about their harmfulness herbicides made up of active ingredients, 2,4-D, MCPA and
Mecoprop will continue to be prohibited for precautionary reasons until the availability of the
products' re-evaluation results by recognized organizations.”).
95
HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, RE-EVALUATION OF THE LAWN
AND TURF USES OF 2,4-D, PROPOSED ACCEPTABILITY FOR CONTINUING REGISTRATION – PACR
2005-01 (Feb. 21, 2005).
96
HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, RE-EVALUATION DECISION: (2,4DICHLOROPHENOXY) ACETIC ACID [2,4-D] (May 16, 2008).
97
Id. at 1, 3, 6-7, 49-59.
91
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into the risk assessment to account for this data gap.” 98 The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had come to a similar
conclusion in 2005 about allowing continued use of 2,4-D, but also noted
that concern existed about the potential for endocrine disruption and a
lack of studies to specifically assess 2,4-D’s endocrine disruption
potential. 99
Despite the results of PMRA’s re-evaluation of 2,4-D, both Québec
and Ontario maintained their approach of banning this pesticide for
cosmetic purposes. 100 The legislative authority to do so is clear in that
provincial law may be more, but not less, restrictive than federal law
dealing with the same matter, so long as it does not conflict with the
intent of federal law. 101 As noted above, this provincial sphere of
authority was discussed in detail in the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Hudson, where the Court described provincial legislation as
complementary to federal and municipal regulation of pesticide use and
establishing a “tri-level regulatory regime.” 102
G.

FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT AND BACK
AGAIN

In summary, for more than fifteen years diverse civil society groups
in Canada sought and obtained precautionary public policy support to
reduce health and environmental risks from the non-essential use of
pesticides. 103 While 2,4-D often received the most attention throughout
this debate, 104 the bans were never intended to be confined to this single
pesticide. Through democratic action at the local level, in town hall
meetings, before municipal councils and committees, in public education
workshops and more, these groups achieved significant public policy
98

Id. at 8.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REREGISTRATION ELIGIBILITY DECISION FOR 2,4-D (June
2005), available at www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/REDs/24d_red.pdf.
100
See supra Part II.D-E.
101
See 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2
S.C.R. 241, ¶¶ 11, 16-19, 26, 28-29, 35, 37-39 (Can.).
102
Id. ¶ 39.
103
See supra Part II.A-B, D-E; see also Kathleen Cooper & Theresa McClenaghan, Ban
Stands: Canadian Municipalities Have the Power To Restrict Pesticide Use Thanks to Hudson
Québec and the Supreme Court, 31 ALTERNATIVES J. 2, 23 (2005).
104
See, e.g., Letter from Can. Envt’l Law Ass’n et al. to Pest Mgmt. Regulatory Agency (Apr.
22, 2005), available at s.cela.ca/files/uploads/508_2_4_D.pdf; Response to Consultation, Beyond
Pesticides (Washington, D.C., on behalf of 51 organizations), 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid Risk
Assessment, Docket ID No. OPP-2004-0167 (Mar. 4, 2005) (on file with authors); Meg Sears et al.,
Pesticide Assessment: Protecting Public Health on the Home Turf, 11(4) PAEDIATRICS & CHILD
HEALTH 229, 233 (Apr. 2006).
99
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changes followed by the passage of local by-laws restricting the use of
pesticides on private property. 105 The groups also pushed for and
participated in multi-year, multi-stakeholder consultation processes with
a view to obtaining province-wide bans. 106
Likewise in the courts, particularly in Canada’s highest court,
procedural rights enabled public interest organizations and citizens to
bring much broader considerations of public policy than just the
arguments advanced by the pesticide companies in Hudson. 107 The
Supreme Court of Canada was clearly influenced by the submissions
made by the public interest interveners, and the extent of their influence
is reflected in “several passages in the judgment ranging from the
contextual statements (such as the opening passage) to the heart of the
legal question on appeal (such as the appropriate conflict test).” 108 The
judgment set a precedent in guiding municipalities on how they may
legitimately use municipal powers to protect health and environment and,
more broadly, incorporated a public interest perspective by interpreting
By-law 270 in a manner that was consistent with international law’s
precautionary principle. 109
III. DOW’S NAFTA CHALLENGE TO QUÉBEC’S PESTICIDES
MANAGEMENT CODE
A.

INTRODUCTION AND NAFTA CONTEXT

In the years following the Supreme Court decision in Hudson,
municipal by-laws were proliferating across Canada. Specifically,
Québec and Ontario were considering provincial statutes, and the multiyear process continued to re-evaluate 2,4-D. The parallel story unfolding
in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the use of NAFTA Chapter 11’s
ISDS mechanism to make claims challenging environmental and health
regulations. Analysts pointed to “the unexpectedly broad and aggressive
use of this process to challenge public policy and public welfare
105

See supra Part II.B, D.
See supra Part II.E; see, e.g., Press Release, Can. Envt’l Law Ass’n, CELA in Cheering
Section for Province-Wide Ban on Non-Essential Pesticides (Aug. 30, 2007), available at
www.cela.ca/newsevents/media-release/cela-cheering-section-province-wide-ban-non-essentialpesticides.
107
See DEMARCO, supra note 56, at 321-24.
108
Id. at 324.
109
Id. at 324; see also Arlene Kwasniak & Alison Peel, Municipal Regulation of Pesticide
Use, 16(3) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTRE OF ALBERTA NEWS BRIEF (2001), available at
www.elc.ab.ca/pages/Publications/NewsBrief.aspx?id=476.
106
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measures, including environmental measures.” 110 Trade scholars
commented on the significant imbalance between private investors’
rights and the protection and promotion of the broader public goods
under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 regime. 111 They noted that this disparity is
exacerbated by the lack of transparency and public access to the process,
the limited opportunity for public participation, and the cloud of secrecy
over the actual adjudication of arbitration proceedings.112
In contrast, investors contemplating initiating a claim face virtually
no constraints other than to follow the procedural requirement set out in
Section B of Chapter 11. 113 Filing a Notice of Intent to arbitrate, which
triggers a consultation process, commences the investor claim process.
The investor is then required to file the actual Notice of Arbitration. An
investor may submit a dispute to arbitration through one of the two
methods provided by the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or through the processes provided by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
Thus, when the claim is issued, a process selected by the investor
governs the arbitration. 114 For many years, there was no legal obligation
on governments to make these notices public, 115 though policy has
changed in this area, as discussed in more detail below with respect to
the adjudication of NAFTA disputes. The only mandatory notification
requirement is that a claimant notify the NAFTA Commission Secretariat
of its request to convene a panel. 116
It is noteworthy that, for almost a century prior to NAFTA, ISDS
mechanisms had existed in bilateral investment agreements between
developed and developing countries. 117 Uniquely, NAFTA was the first
110

HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 5 (1999), available at www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf.
111
HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA’S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS (2001),
available at www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf; Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers:
Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 14749 (2002).
112
Tollefson, supra note 111, at 148-49, 162-65; see also MANN, supra note 111, at 20.
113
MANN, supra note 111, at 39.
114
Id. at 37.
115
Id. at 42; see also NAFTA FREE TRADE COMM’N, NOTES OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN
CHAPTER
11
PROVISIONS
(July
31,
2001),
available
at
www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf [hereinafter NOTES OF
INTERPRETATION].
116
Tollefson, supra note 111, at 163.
117
KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY 40 (2009).
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to contain ISDS provisions applying to more than one developed
country. 118 Such provisions originated to protect investments from less
developed judicial systems prevalent in developing countries, 119 or
otherwise politically unstable countries 120 where investors demanded the
security of a neutral and binding international tribunal before which they
could advance claims against government actions that resulted in loss, or
substantial loss, of their investment value. 121
Under NAFTA, ISDS claims have proliferated against Canadian
public interest measures. By January 2013, thirty-four NAFTA investor
claims had been commenced against Canada. Close to half of those
claims were related to environmental and health policy measures (see
Table 1). Commenting on this trend as early as 1999, analysts noted that
“the provisions designed to ensure security and predictability for the
investors have now created uncertainty and unpredictability for
environmental (and other) regulators.” 122
There is rich irony here. The ISDS mechanism originated as a
means to protect the rights of investors from unfair or arbitrary action by
countries with less developed judicial systems. 123 However, in Canada,
the NAFTA ISDS arbitration mechanism can undermine domestic public
interest regulation 124 while providing the public with greatly limited
recourse to engage in these disputes 125 when compared to the
sophisticated procedural tools available to them within Canada’s modern
judicial system.
Before turning to the particulars of the Dow claim, the following
section reviews the procedures for adjudication of Chapter 11 disputes
and associated procedural reform efforts to address criticisms about lack
of public access to proceedings that concern public interest regulation. It
is followed by brief summaries of two aspects of NAFTA: the nature of
environmental and health protections contained therein; and two of
Chapter 11’s substantive rights, namely those relied upon by Dow in its
Notice of Arbitration: Articles 1105 and 1110.

118

Francis C.R. Price, Public Good: Private Gain. NAFTA, Chapter 11, 26 LAWNOW 36, 36
(Dec. 1, 2001).
119
TIENHAARA, supra note 117, at 48.
120
MANN, supra note 111, at 5, 7.
121
Id.
122
MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 110, at 5.
123
MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 110, at 48; TIENHAARA, supra note 117, at 48.
124
Gus Van Harten, Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime, in BOS. UNIV., THE FUTURE
OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 43-46 (Nov. 2009), available at
www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf.
125
Id. at 47-48.
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Adjudication of Chapter 11 Disputes

A three-member tribunal adjudicates investor claims under Chapter
11. The disputing parties, that is, the investor and the state, each
nominate a member while a third neutral arbitrator is appointed on the
agreement of both Parties or by the Secretary General of the ICSID from
the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators. 126 Although this is the norm in
commercial arbitration, critics have charged that Chapter 11 “is
problematic when issues of public welfare and public policy are placed
against private interests.” 127 The ability of each Party to choose its
arbitrator is also a significant difference between domestic courts and the
arbitration process. 128 Tribunal members appointed to adjudicate disputes
generally tend to have a commercial law background, leading to
concerns that arbitrators may lack the necessary expertise to consider the
broader public policy implications that arise in the context of Chapter 11
claims. 129 Moreover, tribunal members are required to interpret the rights
granted to investors within Chapter 11 in the context of NAFTA’s
objectives, which are purely commercial, set forth in Article 102.
Article 102: Objectives
1. The objectives of this Agreement . . . are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties;
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of
the Parties;
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in each Party’s territory;
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application
of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of
disputes; and
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral
130
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.

Since NAFTA’s adoption, efforts have been made to improve
transparency of the decisionmaking process in response to claims that
Chapter 11 is biased in favour of the commercial rights of foreign

126

NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1125.
MANN, supra note 111, at 38-39.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 39.
130
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102.
127
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investors. 131 One scholar described the context of these reforms as
follows: “[T]he three NAFTA governments have accepted the public
interest arguments that lawsuits against our governments involving large
sums of public money, which also concern public regulations and
government decisions, may not be treated the same, procedurally, as
truly private merely commercial disputes between corporate actors.” 132
Reform efforts of the NAFTA governments have included measures
related to improving public access to Chapter 11 tribunals in three areas
(access to tribunal documents, participation in tribunals, and observation
of tribunal proceedings) as follows:
x

x

x

In August 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
(FTC) issued Notes of Interpretation on Chapter 11
committing NAFTA governments to make public all
documents submitted to or issued by Chapter 11 tribunals,
except in limited circumstances. 133 This FTC guidance also
addressed the interpretation of minimum standard of
treatment to be accorded foreign investors (as discussed
further below).
In October 2004, the FTC issued a statement with
recommendations for non-disputing party participation,
which gives explicit support for admitting non-disputing
parties as amici curiae. 134
In 2003 and 2004, NAFTA parties also committed to
making NAFTA arbitrations open to the public.135

131

Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 48 (2003).
132
MICHELLE SWENARCHUK, THE NAFTA INVESTMENT CHAPTER: EXTREME CORPORATE
RIGHTS 5 (June 11, 2003), available at s.cela.ca/files/uploads/451nafta.pdf.
133
NOTES OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 115.
134
NAFTA FREE TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION ON NONDISPUTING
PARTY
PARTICIPATION
(Oct.
2004),
available
at
www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/Nondisputing-en.pdf [hereinafter FTC STATEMENT].
135
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces
New Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), available at www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen; see also OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT—“A
DECADE
OF
ACHIEVEMENT”
(July
16,
2004),
available
at
www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/July/NAFTA_Free_Trade_Commiss
ion_Joint_Statement_-_A_Decade_of_Achievement.html; HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION STATEMENTS OF OCTOBER 7, 2003, ON
NAFTA’S CHAPTER 11: NEVER-NEVER LAND OR REAL PROGRESS? 3 (2003), available at
www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/trade_ftc_comment_oct03.pdf. Mann notes that the statements released
separately by the U.S. and Canada are not binding on Tribunals. Previous Tribunals, including the
Methanex tribunal, have ruled that without the arbitrating parties consent the process cannot be open
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The second of these reforms, the FTC interpretative statement on
Chapter 11, 136 provides guidance on when a tribunal is empowered to
accept an amicus curie submission. These include whether the
submissions would truly assist the tribunal in reaching a decision,
whether the submission would address matters within the scope of the
dispute, whether the amicus has demonstrated a significant interest in the
dispute, and whether there is a public interest in the dispute.137
Reform efforts have also occurred within the ICSID, 138 which
resulted in the adoption of Arbitration Rules on transparency and amicus
submissions in 2006. 139 Under the UNCITRAL and other rules, the
tribunal’s power to accept amicus briefs is part of a more general
discretion to conduct the proceeding as it deems appropriate in order to
do justice in each instance. 140 The UNCITRAL Working Group on
Arbitration and Conciliation is preparing a legal standard on
transparency for inclusion in its rules, rather than merely in its
guidelines. 141 This standard aims to make important information and
documents available early in the arbitral proceedings, for hearings to be
held in public where possible, and to allow third parties to make
submissions in the proceedings. 142
These reforms have unevenly improved the situation by removing,
to some extent, the shroud of secrecy surrounding NAFTA tribunal

to the public. Only an amendment to NAFTA could create a legally binding requirement for
arbitrations to be open to the public. Such a legal requirement is different from acceptance of amicus
briefs, which a tribunal can do without the consent of either or both the arbitrating parties. Id. at 3.
136
FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134.
137
Id. ¶ B6.
138
Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency Requirement in the New UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules: A Premonitory View, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, available at
www.iisd.org/itn/2010/09/23/the-transparency-requirement-in-the-new-uncitral-arbitration-rules-apremonitory-view/.
139
INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATION
AND
at
RULES
115,
117,
122
(Apr.
2006),
available
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
140
ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., AMICUS CURIAE & INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS: PART TWO
4
(Feb.
29,
2012),
available
at
a4id.org/sites/default/files/user/Amicus%20Curiae%20Legal%20Guide%20Part%20Two%20LG.pdf
141
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation)
On Its 58th Sess., Feb. 4, 2013-Feb. 8, 2013, ¶¶ 15-94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/765, available at daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V13/808/19/PDF/V1380819.pdf?OpenElement. The Working
Group has completed its third reading of the rules on transparency and produced a revised draft of
the rules on transparency of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Under Articles 3, 4 and 6, the new
rules require an arbitral tribunal, subject to certain conditions, to make documents available to the
public, facilitate public access to hearings, and allow the participation of third persons.
142
ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 140, at 6.
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proceedings. However, tribunals maintain broad discretion to allow
greater public access including whether to accept amicus briefs. This
discretion remains notwithstanding ICSID Rule 37(2) 143 or the FTC
recommendations 144 concerning procedures for the participation of nondisputing parties.
The first amicus brief accepted by a NAFTA tribunal was in
Methanex v. U.S. in 2001, a case that provided an important first step
towards increasing transparency and access to NAFTA tribunal
proceedings. 145 Since Methanex, there have been four NAFTA tribunals
that addressed amicus curiae applications, all operating under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 146 as well as applying the criteria found in
the FTC statement on non-disputing party participation.147 These
included tribunals in Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada; Glamis Gold,
Ltd. v. U.S.; Grand River Enterprises Six Nations v. U.S.; and Apotex v.
United States. In all but one, Apotex v. U.S., the amicus request was
denied. 148
While there is now a well-established precedent for the public to
participate in Chapter 11 arbitration through the amicus process, this
right remains subject to the discretion of the panel and is determined on a
case-by-case basis. 149 Moreover, the extent to which the public will be
able to gain complete access to documents filed by the Parties to the
arbitration proceedings is unclear. To date, there is no formal guideline
governing the amicus process beyond the brief FTC statement noting
recommendations for tribunal procedures in accepting written
submissions and the ICSID Arbitration Rule 37 regarding submissions of
non-disputing parties. 150
Commentators note that in order to allow a full hearing, including
public interest issues, there should be a requirement for panels to accept

143

INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 139, at 117.
FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134.
145
HOWARD MANN, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE FINAL
DECISION IN METHANEX V. UNITED STATES: SOME NEW WINE IN SOME NEW BOTTLES 11-13 (Aug.
2005), available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf; see also FTC STATEMENT,
supra note 134.
146
UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (AS
REVISED IN 2010) (2011), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rulesrevised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.
147
FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134.
148
Sarah Schadendorf, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Analysis of
ICSID and NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 6 (2013).
149
FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134, ¶¶ A1, B6.
150
MANN, supra note 111, at 45; see also FTC STATEMENT, supra note 134.
144
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amicus curiae submissions. 151 As well, in order to achieve greater
consistency than that currently provided by the NAFTA ad hoc tribunals,
it has long been suggested, though not acted upon, that a permanent
review panel be established. 152 This review panel would specialize in the
construction and interpretation of NAFTA provisions 153 and provide
binding precedents. 154
Overall, these reforms, and suggested reforms, have not changed the
fact that public participation in the Chapter 11 arbitration proceedings
remains generally limited to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, at the
discretion of the tribunal, in contrast to broader rights and proceedings
available before domestic courts. Nor have these reforms changed the
fact that public interest, environmental, and health measures continue to
be targeted by foreign investors under Chapter 11, as illustrated by the
Dow claim and other similar claims, as summarized in Table 1.
2.

Chapter 11 Overrides Environment and Health Measures in NAFTA

Despite the fact that NAFTA contains provisions that appear to
ensure a government’s ability to protect the environment and public
health, namely within NAFTA’s preamble and Articles 1101 and 1114,
these are trumped by other provisions to protect investor rights.
Moreover, NAFTA provisions must be interpreted according to
relevant international law rules of treaty interpretation as elaborated in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. These rules require that
when interpreting the substantive provisions of treaties, like NAFTA,
one must consider the object and purpose of the treaty, which in the case
of NAFTA are purely commercial, as well as the treaty’s context. 155 The
NAFTA preamble, having less legal force than the body of the
agreement, includes resolutions to “undertake each of the preceding
[liberalizing goals] in a manner consistent with environmental protection
and conservation; preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public
151

Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in InvestorState Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 103, 127 (2007).
152
Id. at 103.
153
INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE
FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION, Annex, at 3 (Oct. 22, 2004), available at
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnn
ouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf (stating that an ICSID appellate
body would have to be composed of “persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise
in law, international investment and investment treaties.”).
154
Id.; see also Byrnes, supra note 151.
155
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331.
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welfare; promote sustainable development; [and] strengthen the
development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.”156
NAFTA also contains Non-Precluded Measures clauses in Article
1101(4) for public health measures and in 1114(1) for environmental
protection measures. These articles carve out any “measure . . .
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns” 157 from liability. One
scholar notes that Article 1114 “explicitly reserves each nation’s
sovereign right to adopt laws or policies of general application
controlling or regulating or restricting investments so as to preserve or
protect the environment.” 158
However, in order to benefit from these provisions’ protection, the
measures must be “otherwise consistent with this Chapter [11].” 159 As a
result, Articles 1101 and 1114 have not effectively shielded many public
interest measures, nor deterred investors from bringing claims. Rather, as
discussed further below, the interpretation and application of other
Chapter 11 substantive rights, provided for in Articles 1105 and 1110,
can threaten environmental and public health measures.
3. Minimum Standard of Treatment—Article 1105
Investors’ legitimate expectations are incorporated into their Claims
for Arbitration and are considered by NAFTA tribunals to determine if a
measure meets the Chapter 11 minimum standard of treatment provision
found in Article 1105. 160 The legal test established for Article 1105,
although vague and not easily definable, broadly requires determining
whether a government measure was developed according to due process,
with transparency, in good faith, and according to natural justice. 161 In
short, Article 1105 is meant to protect an international investment from
arbitrary government measures. 162 Legitimate investor expectations are

156

NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(1).
158
Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration Under
NAFTA Chapter 11, 7 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L., ECON.171, 175 (2007).
159
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(1).
160
IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 37, 165-69 (May 11, 2008); see also Glamis Gold,
Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/ICSID, Award, ¶ 561 (June 8, 2009), available at
italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf.
161
See Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award.
162
Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA
Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 279, 287 (2005); see also NOTES OF INTERPRETATION, supra
note 115.
157
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an element of this legal test. 163 These expectations also inform the test’s
other components, which include:
x
x
x
x

How stable and predictable does the investor consider the
host party’s legal framework to be;
Does the investor consider the conduct to be arbitrary or
discriminatory;
Does the investor consider the measure to have been put in
place with transparency and procedural fairness; and
Does the investor consider the measure to be reasonable. 164

4. Expropriation—Article 1110
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 expropriation provision in Article 1110
anticipates the possibility that government action could be tantamount to
direct expropriation, where government takes possession of private
property in exchange for compensation. The provision provides that
governments are allowed to expropriate an investment only: (a) for a
public purpose, (b) on a non-discriminatory basis, (c) in accordance with
due process of law and Article 1105(1), and (d) on payment of
compensation. 165 If these criteria are not met, an investor will have a
right to claim compensation.
The expropriation provision covers both direct and indirect
expropriation. Direct expropriation occurs when the government takes
possession of private property in exchange for compensation. Indirect
expropriation is generally accepted by international investment tribunals,
such as those established under Chapter 11, to occur when regulations
have the effect of substantially reducing the value of property. In other
words, the effect of indirect expropriation is considered similar to the
effect of a direct expropriation. However, a measure is not considered an
indirect expropriation if it results from bona fide regulation within the
regulatory powers of a state, even if economic injury results. 166 To
determine whether a general measure amounts to an indirect
163

See Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award, ¶¶ 619-22.
TUDOR, supra note 160; see also Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and
Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 39-41
(2011).
165
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1).
166
S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Partial Award, ¶ 281 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
italaw.com/documents/SDMeyers-1stPartialAward.pdf;
see
also
Methanex
v.
U.S.,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Amended Statement of Defense of the Respondent United States of America,
¶¶
410-11
(Dec.
5,
2003),
available
at
naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexSuppStatementOfDefenseAmend.pdf.
164
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expropriation requires consideration of the degree of interference with
the investment, the purpose of the measure, and the investor’s legitimate
expectations in relation to the use and enjoyment of its investment.167
In regards to an investors’ legitimate expectation, the jurisprudence
on Article 1110 suggests that an investor should expect a host state to
adopt legitimate and proportionate regulatory measures in the general
public’s interest. 168 In addition, a tribunal will also take specific
commitments made by a government to an investor into account in its
determination of investor expectations.169 For example, Dow considered
the Government of Québec’s commitment to review its 2,4-D ban in light
of PMRA’s re-evaluation of the pesticide to be a legitimate
expectation. 170
B.

OVERVIEW OF DOW’S CLAIM

Following the Supreme Court decision in Hudson as pesticide
bylaws proliferated across Canada and both Québec and Ontario
considered enacting provincial statutes, environmental organizations in
Québec and Ontario heard persistent rumours of a possible NAFTA
challenge. 171 Such a challenge came in 2008 against Québec’s provincial
ban, 172 three months after PMRA finalized its decision to allow the
continued registration of 2,4-D, 173 and two months after Ontario passed
legislation to ban cosmetic pesticide use province-wide. 174 Ontario’s new
law would not come into force until implementing regulations could be
developed, the crucial details of which were the subject of active debate,
notably about what pesticides would ultimately be included in the ban.175

167

Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 19, 21, 24.
Id. at 24; see also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Rep. of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award
(Sept.
11,
2007),
available
at
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0619.pdf.
169
Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 24-25.
170
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 9
(Mar. 31, 2009).
171
Personal communication between the author, Kathleen Cooper, and the following: Gideon
Foreman, Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment; Angela Rickman, formerly with
the Sierra Club of Canada; Lisa Gue, David Suzuki Foundation; William Amos, Ecojustice; Rich
Waite, formerly with the Toronto Environmental Alliance; and Sidney Ribaux, Equiterre.
172
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Trade Agreement (Aug. 25,
2008).
173
HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96.
174
Pesticides Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.11, art. 7.1 (Can.).
175
Pesticides Act, R.O. 63/09, art. 4(5), 16 (Can.); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, supra
note 93.
168
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In August 2008, Dow filed a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration, on its own behalf and on behalf of its Canadian subsidiary,
against the Government of Canada under Chapter 11. 176 The Notice of
Intent sought $2 million from the Government of Canada as well as
“further relief including additional damages,” 177 to compensate for
alleged losses caused by the Government of Québec’s ban on the sale
and use of pesticides containing 2,4-D, on lawns other than golf
courses. 178
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration 179 followed in March 2009 and sought,
pursuant to NAFTA’s Article 1135(b), 180 “by way of restitution (a) the
repeal of the Ban; and (b) such damages, costs, interest, amounts for tax
consequences . . . resulting from Canada’s breaches which cannot
adequately be compensated by restitution.” 181 Dow further claimed,
alternatively, pursuant to Article 1135(a), “an award in the amount of at
least two million dollars for damages caused by Canada’s breaches of its
obligation under Chapter 11 NAFTA for, but without limitation, loss of
sales, profits, goodwill, investment and other costs related to the
products” 182 and further costs associated with, among other things, legal
representation, expert fees, and tax consequences. 183
With these two claims, the Notice of Arbitration made a peculiar
distinction between Article 1135(a) and 1135(b), seeking first the repeal
of the ban as well as monetary damages pursuant to Article 1135(b) and,
in the alternative, a monetary award of compensation pursuant to Article
1135(a). 184 However, in the entirety of Article 1135, the only remedies
available for investors are monetary damages and any applicable interest
under Article 1135(a), 185 and restitution of property, again, in the form of
monetary damages, and any applicable interest under Article 1135 (b).186
Nowhere is the repeal of a measure outlined as an available remedy.
176

Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Intent.
Id. ¶ 60(f).
178
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 17
(Mar. 31, 2009). Environmental organizations saw the small amount of money claimed by Dow as
an indication of the NAFTA claim service as an advocacy device to try to scare off Ontario and other
provinces from cosmetic pesticide bans. See Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, Cosmetic
Pesticide Bans Unaffected by DOW-Québec Deal (May 30, 2011), available at
www.cela.ca/newsevents/media-release/cosmetic-pesticide-bans-unaffected-dow-quebec-deal.
179
Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration.
180
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135(1).
181
Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 55.
182
Id. ¶ 56(a).
183
Id. ¶ 56(b)-(e).
184
Id. ¶ 56(a)-(e).
185
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135(a).
186
Id. art. 1135(b).
177
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Substantive reasons for the claim as spelled out in the Notice of
Arbitration supported Dow’s overall claim that Canada, due to the
actions of Québec, was in breach of two NAFTA obligations contained
in Chapter 11 187 and as such “as a party to NAFTA, Canada is
responsible for the NAFTA-inconsistent conduct of Québec.” 188 Dow
further proposed that three arbitrators be appointed and that the
arbitration take place in Ottawa, Ontario.189
The foundation of Dow’s concerns was that the Québec ban on 2,4D had been adopted and maintained notwithstanding two key admissions
by the government of Québec. First, documents obtained by Dow via
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests included statements by Québec
government officials that the ban on 2,4-D could not be scientifically
defended. Rather, these officials noted that the ban should rest instead on
“less firm grounds” such as the precautionary principle or a policy
decision resulting from the will of the population (similar to an existing
Québec Forest Protection Strategy that prohibited use of chemical
pesticides). 190 Dow stated that “these [FOI] documents make clear that
Québec recognized the absence of a scientific basis for its ban on 2,4-D.
Moreover, even its stated reliance on an interpretation of the
precautionary approach was motivated by political considerations, rather
than any legitimate scientific concerns.” 191
The second admission, according to Dow, was that the FOI
documents obtained indicated that due to the scientific uncertainty
concerning the toxicity of 2,4-D, Québec officials intended to review the
ban on 2,4-D in light of the results of ongoing reviews by regulatory
agencies in Canada and the United States. 192
In 2005 and 2008, following prevailing risk assessment practices,
the EPA 193 and the PMRA 194 concluded that insufficient evidence
existed to consider 2,4-D to be a cancer risk. More generally, these two
agencies made an overall finding that the continued use of this pesticide
was an acceptable risk. Dow cited the PMRA conclusions and noted they
were in accord with similar findings made in the late 1990s and early
2000s by other regulatory agencies and expert review panels in the
United States, New Zealand, and within the World Health
187

Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 8-9.
Id. ¶ 7.
189
Id. ¶ 57.
190
Id. ¶¶ 22-24.
191
Id. ¶ 25.
192
Id. ¶¶ 26-29, 41.
193
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 99.
194
HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96.
188
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Organization. 195 Dow further claimed that, despite these most recent
conclusions of the PMRA and the EPA, Québec “has also failed to act in
accordance with its earlier commitments to review the Ban following the
re-evaluation of 2,4-D.” 196
First, the specific claimed breaches of NAFTA obligations were
with respect to the provisions of Article 1105. 197 Canada was accused of
failing to treat Dow “in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”198 Further,
Dow claimed that Article 1105 was individually and cumulatively
breached by Québec’s actions “in improperly imposing the Ban, in
failing and refusing to review and repeal the Ban, in breaching the
Claimant’s legitimate expectations, in conducting biased and improper
reviews and advancing improper conclusions, and in prohibiting the sale
and use of 2,4-D.” 199 Further, Dow maintained that Canada was “in
breach of international law and its obligations under Article 1105 in
respect of basic due process, transparency, good faith and natural
justice.” 200
The second claimed breach was with provisions of Article 1110.201
Dow claimed that the effect of Québec’s actions from 2003 to 2009,
individually and cumulatively, amounted to measures tantamount to
expropriation of Dow’s investment. 202 Citing Article 1110, Dow noted
that such measures could be justified “only if they are: for a public
purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis; in accordance with due process
and Article 1105(1); and on payment of compensation on a prescribed
basis.” 203 Dow stated that none of these criteria had been met by
Québec—“most particularly, no compensation has ever been paid or
offered” 204 —and thus Canada was in breach of Article 1110 obligations
to avoid direct or indirect expropriation of an investor, except in
accordance with the four criteria listed in Article 1110, noted above.205

195

Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 31-32, 34.
Id. ¶ 46.
197
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105.
198
Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 47.
199
Id. ¶ 48.
200
Id. ¶ 49.
201
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(a).
202
Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶50.
203
Id. ¶ 51.
204
Id. ¶ 52.
205
Id. ¶ 53.
196
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INITIAL REACTIONS FROM NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND POLITICIANS

Public interest environmental and health organizations reacted with
dismay to Dow’s Notice of Intent and later the Notice of Arbitration, and
called on the federal government, specifically the Minister of
International Trade, to vigorously defend Québec’s law, and
acknowledge the appropriate precautionary basis for Québec’s action. 206
Specifically, these organizations asserted that non-discriminatory
regulatory measures for a public purpose in accordance with due process,
are not, under international law, expropriations or violations of the
minimum standard of treatment rules and thus not subject to
compensation. 207 The organizations further called on the federal
government to ensure more robust applications of the precautionary
principle in PMRA risk assessments of pesticides. 208
As a result of public interest groups raising this issue with federal
politicians, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on International Trade
took up the matter. Prior to the Notice of Arbitration being filed, this
committee recommended to the Canadian Parliament, which concurred
with the statement later in the same year, “that the Government
vigorously defend Québec’s Pesticides Management Code in the case
opposing Dow Agroscience and the Government of Canada in order to
safeguard Québec’s right to enact legislation and make regulations in the
public interest.” 209
Dow’s action was widely perceived as an attempt to bring a
regulatory chill on efforts across Canada, particularly in Ontario,
Canada’s most populous province with a government actively
considering a sweeping ban on hundreds of pesticide products. As one
legal commentator observed, the claim by Dow appeared to be aimed “as
much at deterring other governments from taking similar steps to reduce
pesticide use for health and environmental reasons, as much as it [was]
meant to win compensation of $2 million, as claimed, for the incidental

206

DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., BRIEFING NOTE: POTENTIAL NAFTA CHALLENGE TO
QUÉBEC’S BAN OF 2, 4-D LAWN PESTICIDES 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), available at
www.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/media-backgrounder/Dow%2024-D%20Backgrounder-English2009-04-09%20_WA_.pdf/at_download/file.
207
Id. at 1.
208
Id. at 1.
209
CANADA HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMM. ON INT’L TRADE, REPORT 2—CHAPTER
11 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3787580&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=40&Ses=2.
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impacts on Dow’s sales in Québec.” 210
However, when asked in 2008 about a NAFTA challenge to the new
Ontario law, then-Environment Minister John Gerretsen was
unconcerned. Referring to the legal research done by lawyers with the
Ontario Ministry of Environment confirming the validity of province’s
authority to regulate the use of pesticides, the Minister said, “Bring it
on.” 211
There were, of course, legitimate concerns given the fact that such
claims have been particularly threatening to environmental and other
public welfare measures, as summarized in Table 1. However, the
Ontario Environment Minister’s reaction was a direct result of
confidence in a multi-year process by a sophisticated government in a
modern democracy to develop a highly popular law.
D.

TRADE-FOCUSED NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS:
IRONIC CONSEQUENCES

As noted above, ISDS mechanisms originated in agreements
between developed and less developed nations to provide measures that
would protect investors from unfair or arbitrary action by countries with
less developed judicial systems. 212 The unexpected and ironic
consequence of including such mechanisms in NAFTA has been to
undermine domestic public interest regulation using a dispute resolution
mechanism that denies the public the procedural fairness that exists in
their modern judicial system. 213 This consequence is largely due to the
narrow purview of NAFTA, with its overall objectives focused on trade
and the paramount importance assigned to investor rights by the terms of
Chapter 11. 214
Article 1105 speaks to the obligation of a Party “to accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security.” 215 The provision has been broadly interpreted to
require that government measures will be developed with due process,
transparency, in good faith, and according to natural justice. 216 These are
210

Van Harten, supra note 124, at 43.
Communication from John Gerretsen, Minister of Env’t for Ontario, at a meeting of health
and environmental organizations to Kathleen Cooper (Oct. 2008) (on file with authors).
212
Price, supra note 118, at 36.
213
MANN, supra note 111, at 37-46; see infra Table 1.
214
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102, ch.11.
215
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105(1).
216
TUDOR, supra note 160, at 37.
211
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indeed important and valid principles derived from the rule of law, which
has defined the legal framework of democratic governments. As such,
these expectations similarly constitute a minimum standard of treatment
that Canadians or the citizens of any other modern democracy have come
to expect from their lawmakers and their courts. However, under
NAFTA, the application of these principles has tended to be considerably
narrowed in the context of a dispute over the minimum standard of
treatment, where the focus has largely been confined to matters of trade
and investment. In the Dow example, this narrow focus is on lost sales of
a single pesticide by a single company.
This narrow lens can ignore the due process that was provided to the
Canadian public on the broader, but directly related, issue of cosmetic
pesticide bans. As described above, 217 a significant amount of such due
process accorded to the public occurred in a transparent fashion, during
more than fifteen years of efforts at the level of local and provincial
governments in Québec, in the Québec Courts, and at the Supreme Court
of Canada, not to mention similar extensive activity elsewhere in Canada
either by municipal or provincial governments or in the Ontario courts. It
is also important to note that as specific by-laws were developed, and
became the subject of legal challenges, the due process that was provided
under Canada’s legislative and judicial systems stands in sharp contrast
to the NAFTA arbitration process, which has largely been cloaked in
secrecy and where public participation, when it is allowed, lacks key
aspects of basic procedural fairness. 218
Similarly, Article 1110 provides that regulatory measures enacted
by a government must be for a public purpose through the due process of
law and applied without discrimination. 219 Otherwise, the measure may
give rise to investor claims for compensation if it results in expropriation
or is tantamount to expropriation. Here again, despite many years of due
process, a tribunal operating within the narrow objectives of NAFTA’s
trade focus would make the determination as to whether Québec’s
pesticide ban amounts to expropriation. 220 As noted above, members of
these tribunals have expertise that rarely extends beyond commercial
law. Further, their proceedings provide limited opportunity for broader
public input as compared to that available under the Canadian legislative
and judicial system. Thus, Article 1110, like Article 1105, provides far
greater emphasis on the investor’s legitimate commercial expectations as

217

See supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part II, III.A.1-2.
219
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110.
220
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
218
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opposed to the public’s legitimate expectations that their government
will enact environmental measures to protect their welfare.221
Equiterre, a Québec-based environmental group, and the David
Suzuki Foundation, a Canadian environmental organization based in
Vancouver, British Columbia, expressed these concerns in response to
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration. 222 They announced their intention to file a
joint amicus curiae submission once a tribunal was established. 223
However, both groups expressed concerns that even in cases such as
Dow, where “matters of the public interest are engaged, NAFTA Chapter
11 only guarantees legal standing to eligible investors, leaving other civil
society actors to engage in a limited fashion (in writing only) at the
discretion of the arbitrators.” 224 Given how the amicus curiae process
has developed in Chapter 11 case law, the organizations claimed they
had no confidence that even when the panel was established, it would
have the discretion to benefit from oral submissions from non-disputing
parties with a distinct interest and expertise in the matter. The groups
noted that this was in sharp contrast with the rules of practice for
intervention before domestic courts such as the Supreme Court of
Canada. 225
E.

THE MAIN STICKING POINT: PRECAUTIONARY DECISIONMAKING

As described above, Dow’s Notice of Arbitration focused on the
contention that Québec had no scientific basis to impose a ban on 2,4-D,
and had acknowledged as much. 226 According to Dow’s interpretation of
Québec government documentation, Québec recognized the absence of a
scientific basis for its ban on 2,4-D and “even its stated reliance on an
interpretation of the precautionary approach was motivated by political
considerations, rather than any legitimate scientific concerns.” 227
More specifically, Dow pointed to a 2003 Methodology Report 228
used by the Québec government, which Dow claimed had not been made
available for comment. As reviewed in the Briefing Note 229 prepared by
221

Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA's
Chapter 11, 33 CAN. BUS. L.J. 92, 107-08 (2000).
222
DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206.
223
Id. at 2.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 2-3.
226
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 23-25
(Mar. 31, 2009).
227
Id. ¶ 25.
228
Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
229
DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206, at 2.
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environmental organizations, Québec applied what it referred to as
science-based criteria to select pesticides for inclusion in the ban;
namely, to include pesticides that are included on lists compiled by
internationally reputable sources as being suspected to cause cancer or to
be associated with endocrine disruption although at the time such lists
only existed for substances associated with cancer. 230 Québec relied upon
the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its classification as
possible human carcinogens the group of chlorophenoxy herbicides,
which includes 2,4-D. 231 Québec also admitted, as Dow spelled out in the
Notice of Arbitration, 232 that insufficient data existed to assign this
classification to individual substances within the group, but indicated that
when the PMRA re-evaluation was complete, it would reconsider the
inclusion of 2,4-D in the ban. When the positive result of the federal reevaluation did not alter Québec’s ban on 2,4-D, Dow concluded that
“Québec ha[s] failed to honour its commitment to re-evaluate the Ban,
notwithstanding the completion of re-assessments subsequent to the Ban
by both the PMRA and the EPA.” 233
It can be concluded from a review of Dow’s arguments that a clear
assumption is being made that precautionary decisionmaking is not
scientific. Further, when the Québec ban on 2,4-D was not reversed after
the PMRA and other regulatory agencies concluded that continued
registration was acceptable, the arguments made in Dow’s Notice of
Arbitration indicate that Dow clearly considered Québec’s prior
commitment to review its ban was the same as agreeing to reverse it.
In contrast, environmental organizations disputed the results of the
PMRA’s risk assessment of 2,4-D. In this circumstance, these groups
note the ability of risk assessment to reach a conclusion as to a
chemical’s acceptable risk on the basis of an incomplete consideration of
potential health effects. 234 For example, they pointed out that the
European Union Strategy for Endocrine Disruptors had proposed that
2,4-D be considered a Category II chemical on its priority list of
suspected endocrine disrupting chemicals, 235 a health outcome not
230

Id. at 3-4.
INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, supra note 82.
232
Dow AgroSciences, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 21-29.
233
Id. ¶ 30.
234
Letter from Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n et al., to Pest Mgmt. Regulatory Agency, Proposed
Acceptability for Continuing Registration (PACR) 2005-01: Re-Evaluation of the Lawn and Turf
Uses of (2,4-Dichlorophenoxy) Acetic Acid [2,4-D] (Apr. 22, 2005), available at
s.cela.ca/files/uploads/508_2_4_D.pdf; Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, supra note 178;
see also Theresa McClenaghan et al., Environmental Standard Setting and Children’s Health:
Injecting Precaution into Risk Assessment,12(2) J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 245, 249-54 (2003).
235
DAVID SUZUKI FOUND. ET AL., supra note 206, at 3.
231
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considered in the PMRA risk assessment. Although the PMRA did note
that evidence indicated possible endocrine disruption effects of 2,4-D,
this evidence was not considered in the re-evaluation decision due to a
lack of validated test protocols. 236 To this day, the complexity of
endocrine disruption science continues to challenge the development of
such test protocols. 237 Regulatory agencies around the world continue to
work towards establishing official lists of endocrine disrupting
substances. 238 Where such lists are noted in scientific reviews about
endocrine disrupting substances, 2,4-D is included and done so in the
context of calls for more precautionary decisionmaking about the
seriousness of effects related to endocrine disrupting chemicals.239
An extensive debate exists, as summarized below, about whether
the precautionary principle is unscientific. 240 Closely related, an equally
extensive critique exists challenging the notion that chemical risk
assessment, as conducted by the PMRA and other regulatory agencies, is
a purely science-based exercise. 241 Each of these debates is briefly
summarized here.
1.

Applying Precaution and Risk Assessment—Both Are Science-Based
Decisionmaking
Recognizing that there are various formulations of the precautionary
236

HEALTH CANADA PEST MGMT. REGULATORY AGENCY, supra note 96, at 22, 42-43.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 23, at ix, xvxvii, 234-37; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS—ADVANCING RISK
ASSESSMENT 93-119 (2009).
238
Laura M. Plunkett et al., An Enhanced Tiered Toxicity Testing Framework with Triggers
for Assessing Hazards and Risks of Commodity Chemicals, 58 REG. TOXICOLOGY &
PHARMACOLOGY 382, 387 (2010); Robert J. Kavlock et al., Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century:
Implications for Human Health Risk Assessment, 29(4) RISK ANALYSIS 485, 487 (2009); ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., INFORMATION ON OECD WORK RELATED TO ENDOCRINE
DISRUPTORS (2012), available at www.oecd.org/env/ehs/testing/50067203.pdf; Report on the
Protection of Public Health from Endocrine Disruptors, EUR. PARL. DOC. A7-0027/2013, at 6-8, 10,
13-14 (Jan. 28, 2013), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0027+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING PROGRAM COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 6-7 (June
2012), available at www.epa.gov/endo/pubs/EDSP-comprehensive-management-plan.pdf.
239
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 23, at 190.
240
Theresa McClenaghan, Precautionary Principle, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITY OF LIFE
AND WELL-BEING RESEARCH (Alex C. Michalos ed., forthcoming). Note that content in this section
is drawn from parallel research and writing undertaken by Ms. McClenaghan for this chapter in
press. See also Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 174-78 (2001).
241
D. Santillo et al., The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Against Failures of Scientific
Method and Risk Assessment, 36 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 939, 941 (1998); McClenaghan et al.,
supra note 234.
237
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principle, 242 the statement from the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development has been followed sufficiently often that for some, it is the
most authoritative version. 243 The Declaration states that “[i]n order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.” 244
Leaving aside the various critiques of this formulation, 245 it is
fundamentally about applying precaution when there is the potential for
serious harm to the environment or human health, 246 and scientific
uncertainty as to the extent of the harm or the causes of the harm. 247
“Uncertainty” in this context means more than speculation, 248 and is
about the extent of the harm, as well as causation. 249 It is science-based
because there must be a basis on which to conclude that a threat of harm
is serious and perhaps irreversible. While this latter point may continue
to be disputed, within the precautionary principle debate, most agree that
it is a tool for bringing science and policy together for effective
decisionmaking on difficult subjects where much is at stake.250
Closely related, an equally extensive critique exists challenging the
notion that chemical risk assessment, as conducted by the PMRA and
other regulatory agencies, is a purely science-based exercise. The

242

Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the Precautionary Principle, and Burdens of
Proof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 75 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999).
243
Claudia Saladin, Precautionary Principle in International Law, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ENVTL. HEALTH 270, 271-73 (2000); John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary
Principle, 27 WILLIAM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2002).
244
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENV’T & DEV., U.N. AGENDA 21, RIO DECLARATION,
Principle 15, (reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)), available at www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/.
245
See Saladin, supra note 243, at 273; WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE & TECH., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 12 (Mar. 2005), available at
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139578e.pdf.
246
Gwynne Lyons et al., An Environmentalist’s Vision of Operationalizing the Precautionary
Principle in the Management of Chemicals, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 289, 28990 (2000).
247
Carl Smith, The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Policy—Science,
Uncertainty, and Sustainability, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 263, 265 (2000); Joel
A. Tickner & Polly Hoppin, Children’s Environmental Health: A Case Study in Implementing the
Precautionary Principle, 6 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 281, 281 (2000).
248
Telstra v. Hornsby Shire Council [2006] NSWLEC 133, at ¶ 147-48, 204 (Austl.); see
WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., supra note 245, at 31.
249
See CAMERON & ABOUCHAR, supra note 63, at 20; Saladin, supra note 243, at 275;
Telstra, NSWLEC 133, ¶ 140.
250
See Santillo et al., supra note 241, at 941.
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limitations of risk assessment have been extensively described251
including, for example:
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

limits on criteria for the selection of hazards to assess;
the practice of leaving out some hazards due to bias or lack
of knowledge;
the inability to factor impacts of cumulative effects,
additive or synergistic effects;
limits on the ability to quantify impacts;
the role of professional judgment to assess and/or fill data
gaps;
the limitations arising from health or other impact endpoints under consideration such as endocrine disruption or
other complex conditions involving complex dose-response
and/or long latency periods, and lack of data about such
impacts;
lack of data about substances, processes, and ecosystem
variables;
tendency to make type II errors as a result of designing
studies to rigorously avoid type I errors; 252
potential for surprise in behaviour of systems and so on.

In sum, the apparent “certainty” resulting from the expression of
risk assessment analytical results in quantitative terms is often illusory.
The Dow Notice of Arbitration challenged the legitimacy of the
precautionary principle as a basis for decisionmaking and claimed that
the scientific result from the PMRA risk assessment was sufficient to
reverse Québec’s unscientific decision. In contrast, environmental groups
disputed the notion that the PMRA risk assessment result was purely
scientific, and supported Québec’s decision to retain its ban on a
precautionary basis in light of ongoing scientific uncertainty.
251

See Santillo et al., supra note 241, at 941-48; Smith, supra note 247, at 264; David Kriebel
et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871
(2001); CANADIAN ENVTL. LAW ASS’N, IMPLEMENTING PRECAUTION: AN NGO RESPONSE TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S DISCUSSION DOCUMENT “A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH/PRINCIPLE”
5
(Apr.
2002),
available
at
www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/uploads/419precautionary.pdf; WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., supra note 245, at 26 (additionally describing unexpected
outcomes and complex systems that may suddenly change state); ROYAL COMM’N ON ENVTL.
POLLUTION, CHEMICALS IN PRODUCTS: SAFEGUARDING THE ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 11-46
(June
26,
2003),
available
at
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128002317/http://www.rcep.org.uk/chreport.htm.
252
In simple terms, Type II errors are those in which a causal association is missed, whereas
Type I errors are those in which there is a mistaken finding of a causal association.
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What Would a Tribunal Have Done?

The Dow matter was settled without going before a tribunal, as
discussed further below. It is speculative to consider what a tribunal
would have decided particularly given the fact that tribunals are not
bound by the rules of precedent that apply in court proceedings.
Nevertheless, the matter can be considered in light of other tribunal
rulings on similar matters.
Dow’s Notice of Arbitration essentially asked the tribunal to read
into Chapter 11 a requirement that a strict science-based test was
necessary for regulations affecting sales of Dow’s products. 253 This
interpretation flows from Dow’s legitimate expectations for the
minimum standard of treatment provided for in Article 1105, and
specifically, whether as an investor it considered a measure to be
reasonable and not arbitrary, which in Dow’s opinion turned on whether
the Québec ban on 2,4-D had a scientific basis. 254
The legitimate expectations of investors are a major consideration
for NAFTA tribunals when applying the legal tests for the provisions
relied upon by Dow. Legitimate expectations of investors are held to
include measures based on scientific studies and international guidelines,
not measures based on the precautionary principle, which is often
inaccurately conflated by NAFTA tribunals as a political basis. 255 This
focus on a scientific basis underlying the measures in dispute occurred in
the Ethyl and Chemtura cases, which preceded Dow.
Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada involved a NAFTA investor
claim concerning a chemical ban justified on the basis of health and
environmental risks. The case involved the chemical MMT, 256 a gasoline
additive suspected of neurotoxicity. The claim called into question the
scientific basis of the ban, with Ethyl claiming the ban amounted to an
expropriation of its investment. 257 In 1998, the Canadian government
settled with Ethyl for $13 million. 258 As part of the settlement, the
Government of Canada publicly declared that there was no scientific
253

Howard Mann, DOWning NAFTA?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 2, 2009), available
at www.iisd.org/itn/2009/05/03/downing-nafta/.
254
See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 41; see also Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,,
Award, ¶ 24 (June 8, 2009), available at italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf.
255
See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 30, 33 (arguing that the precautionary measures in
the Ethyl claim were driven by political pressure).
256
Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl.
257
Ethyl Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 19-50 (Oct.2,
at
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords1997),
available
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/ethyl-04.pdf.
258
See Gaines, supra note 158, at 183.
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basis to prohibit MMT under Canadian federal law, and explicitly
acknowledged that “current scientific information fails to demonstrate
that MMT impairs the proper functioning of automotive on-board
diagnostic systems . . . and there is no scientific evidence to modify the
conclusions drawn by Health Canada in 1994 that MMT poses no health
risk.” 259 The unavailability of scientific evidence to support the Canadian
measure was a key factor in Canada’s decision to settle in Ethyl. 260
Similarly, in 2010 Canada successfully defended against an investor
claim by Chemtura on scientific grounds. Chemtura’s claim was also
based on alleged breaches of the minimum standard of treatment and
expropriation provisions as a result of a ban on lindane, a pesticide used
in the production of canola. 261 The tribunal held that the government of
Canada’s scientific review of lindane “falls within acceptable scientific
parameters,” 262 but that it was “not for the Tribunal to review the
scientific basis of the PMRA’s decision.” 263 As such, the Chemtura
decision is an example of adjudicators putting emphasis on the scientific
process underlying the risk assessment and regulatory action.
Although NAFTA’s text does not explicitly preclude a public
interest precautionary measure from being considered as a legitimate
measure, tribunals have not upheld such an interpretation. Rather, they
have held such measures to be legitimate on the basis that they were
supported by a scientific study, or by an established international
guideline, rather than a precautionary approach. 264 As the International
Institute of Sustainable Development argued in its amicus submission to
the tribunal in Methanex, Chapter 11 does not require that environment
and health measures be supported by a risk assessment or scientific
study. 265 Rather, a breach of the minimum standard of treatment
259

Press Release, Environment Canada, Government To Act on Agreement on Internal Trade
(AIT) Panel Report on MMT (July 20, 1998) as cited in Gaines, supra note 158, at 183; see also Ken
Traynor, How Canada Became Shill for Ethyl Corp: NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal
Environmental Protection, 23(3) THE INTERVENOR (Sept. 1998); GRACE WOOD & MARIKA EGYED,
RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMBUSTION PRODUCTS OF METHYLCYCLOPENTADIENYL MANGANESE
TRICARBONYL
(MMT)
IN
GASOLINE
(Dec.
6,
1994),
available
at
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/H46-1-34-1994E-1.pdf.
260
See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 29.
261
Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 2 2010), available
at www.worldcourts.com/pca/eng/decisions/2010.08.02_Chemtura_v_Canada.pdf.
262
Id. ¶ 131.
263
Id. ¶ 131.
264
See Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 164, at 26-27; see also Methanex Corp. v. United States,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction & Merits, at Part II.D, 14 (Aug. 3,
2002), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
265
Methanex Corp., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Amicus Curiae Submissions ¶ 21 (Mar. 9, 2004),
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/30475.pdf.
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provisions should simply involve an assessment of whether the measure
was taken arbitrarily.266
However, some international investment law specialists note in
relation to the history of precautionary measures considered by NAFTA
tribunals that “settlement is a good idea in expropriation claims where
governments base their measures on the precautionary principle, as they
are more likely to trigger the requirement of compensation than a
measure based on science evidencing a legitimate concern.” 267
While tribunals have expected a demonstration of traditional
scientific evidence and/or risk assessments to uphold the legitimacy of an
environmental or health measure, there is in fact no express requirement
in NAFTA to do so. As one scholar asserts, “[s]uch a test is simply not
expressed in NAFTA or any other investment treaty, and would seriously
constrain if not fully deny governments the ability to establish acceptable
risk levels to human health and the environment based on the
precautionary principle.” 268
F.

STALEMATE: ALL SIDES CLAIM VICTORY

In May 2011, almost three years after Dow brought its Notice of
Arbitration claim, no further filings occurred and a settlement was
reached without the case proceeding before a NAFTA tribunal. The
Settlement Agreement 269 refers to an exchange of letters between the
Government of Canada and the Government of Québec wherein the
parties agree to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, 270 including that
Québec’s ban on 2,4-D be upheld, 271 the withdrawal of Dow’s Notice of
Arbitration, 272 and that no compensation be provided. 273 As well as a
“full and final settlement,” 274 the Government of Québec also
acknowledged several “agreed principles” 275 that essentially restate the
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reality of the tri-level regulatory regime that exists in Canada to regulate
pesticides, 276 as this was enumerated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Hudson.
The first principle includes the definition of “acceptable risk” 277 as
it is stated in the federal Pest Control Products Act. It then specifies that
the Government of Québec acknowledge the results of this determination
of acceptable risk for 2,4-D in the 2008 PMRA re-evaluation decision,
namely that the risk is acceptable if label directions are followed.278 The
second principle enumerates the nested authority of provinces to regulate
pesticides in a manner more restrictive than the PMRA. 279 The third
notes that, subject to applicable laws, municipalities may also apply a
pesticide regulation that is more restrictive than the PMRA or the
provincial government, in this case, the government of Québec. 280
Both the federal government and Dow framed the settlement as a
victory. 281 Canada’s Minister of International Trade, described the
settlement as confirming “the right of governments to regulate the use of
pesticides,” a right that “will not be compromised by Canada’s
participation in NAFTA or any other trade agreement.” 282
As a sign of its success, Dow saw the fact that Québec publicly
acknowledged the PMRA risk assessment conclusion. “What was most
important to Dow AgroSciences is that [Québec] clarify their perspective
on 2,4-D.” 283 In contrast, environmental groups saw the statement by
Québec as saving face for Dow and supporting the view that Dow would
not have won the case. CELA’s Executive Director and counsel in the
Supreme Court intervention in Hudson noted that “the Québec
government has given nothing away legally with this agreement and
existing or future municipal or provincial pesticide bans are
unaffected.” 284 She further noted, “I am extremely happy no money was
276
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282
Press Release, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Dev., Canada Welcomes Agreement with Dow
AgroSciences (May 27, 2011), available at www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/newscommuniques/2011/145.aspx?view=d.
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paid in this settlement, not even a token amount, and the Supreme Court
decision on the Hudson by-law and all municipal and provincial bans are
still on firm legal footing.” 285
IV. CONCLUSION
The fight for cosmetic pesticide bans in Canada remains a
grassroots movement in every sense of the phrase. It originated in parks,
school grounds, and neighbourhoods among people who worked on
political change with the level of government closest to them. 286 Even
before the country’s highest Court, the legal issues turned on whether
local jurisdiction existed to take precautionary action in the face of
uncertainty and risk as it was perceived at the local level. 287 Both the
Supreme Court and ultimately the Settlement Agreement in the Dow case
confirmed the nested legislative authority for local governments to act. 288
In hindsight, early warnings were prescient about two issues
addressed in this Article: the threat of key NAFTA provisions to public
interest environmental law 289 and the need for precautionary responses in
the face of widespread exposure to low levels of multiple toxic
substances. 290 The wisdom of the latter continues to be confirmed by
extensive and credible scientific evidence, notably, but not limited to, the
multiple challenges of low-level exposure to endocrine disrupting
chemicals. 291 Despite the scientific complexities, a common sense
understanding of this fact is illustrated by longstanding and widespread
support among the Canadian public for the logic of banning needless or
“cosmetic” exposure to pesticides. 292 For the former, while some
procedural safeguards now exist with varying degrees of successful
implementation to improve public access to disputes before NAFTA
tribunals, investors continue to have rights and tools that can potentially
undermine domestic legislation and court rulings.293
The Dow claim, with its singular focus on 2,4-D, was
unsuccessful 294 in repealing or amending Québec’s popular provincial
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law 295 banning the use of certain pesticides, or in deterring other
provinces such as Ontario from creating the most comprehensive
cosmetic pesticide ban in North America. 296 Nevertheless, all sides in
this debate claimed “success” in some form. Dow got a public
acknowledgement from Québec of the federal government’s risk
though
no
compensation. 298
assessment
conclusions, 297
Environmentalists held onto both the Québec law and the knowledge that
NAFTA seemed unable to deter similar laws, grounded in the
precautionary principle, from being enacted in other provinces. 299 The
federal government described the result as confirming the right of
governments to regulate the use of pesticides and the Québec
government retained its pesticide ban. 300
Despite varied perspectives on the outcome, the Dow case, and
others like it, illustrates how NAFTA’s Chapter 11 ISDS mechanisms
can be, and have been, used to try and reverse, and arguably deter,
similar domestic public interest measures. 301 Under Chapter 11, investor
rights can trump public interest rights, chiefly on account of provisions
concerning the legitimate expectations of investors in Articles 1105 and
1110, the singular trade focus in NAFTA overall, and the arbitral
procedures with their lack of accompanying judicial safeguards. 302
In the unlikely event that Chapter 11 were removed from NAFTA, it
would be in keeping with recent steps taken in Australia where, in April
2011, the Australian government refused to enter into any further
international investment agreements with developed countries containing
ISDS provisions on the basis that they:
[do] not support provisions that would confer greater legal rights on
foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses. Nor
will the Government support provisions that would constrain the
ability of Australian governments to make laws on social,
environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those

295

Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, r. 1 (Can.).
See discussion supra Part II.D-E, G.
297
Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(c) (May 25, 2011), available at www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/dow-03.pdf.
298
Id. ¶ 2.
299
See discussion supra Part III.F; see also Press Release, Canadian Envtl. Law Ass’n, supra
note 178.
300
Press Release, Foreign Affairs, Trade & Dev., supra note 282.
301
MANN, supra note 111, at 37-46; Van Harten, supra note 124, at 43.
302
See discussion supra Part III.A.1-4.
296

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/4

44

Cooper et al.: Seeking a Regulatory Chill in Canada

2013]

SEEKING A REGULATORY CHILL IN CANADA

49

laws do not discriminate between domestic and foreign businesses. 303

This recognition by the Australian government underscores the
problem illustrated by the use of ISDS provisions under NAFTA,
including the rich irony in the Dow case. 304 Such investor rights
originated in ISDS mechanisms intended to protect investors from the
vagaries of less developed legislative and judicial systems. 305 Yet, these
same mechanisms can be used to undermine domestic public interest
regulation that, in this case, was the result of many years of due process
in Canadian lawmaking and the Canadian courts. 306 Moreover, the
procedural mechanisms to protect these investor rights under Chapter 11
also deny the public the same rights to fully participate in the arbitration
process. 307 The Dow case illustrates that Chapter 11 investor rights are
misplaced within an investment agreement between nations that have
equally sophisticated legislative and judicial systems.
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Table 1: A Selection of NAFTA Investor Claims Relating to Canadian Public
Interest Environmental and Health Measures 308
January 1994–January 2013
Investor
Ethyl
NoI:
Apr. 14, 1997

S.D. Meyers
NoI:
July 22, 1998

Articles
1102
1106
1110

1102
1105
1106
1110

Basis of claim
U.S. company challenged
the federal environmental
ban on the import and
international trade of
gasoline additive MMT.
The ban was based on
MMT’s suspected
neurotoxicity and its
potential to interfere with
car diagnostics.
U.S. waste treatment
company challenged a
temporary federal ban of
toxic PCB waste exports.

NoA:
Oct. 30, 1998

Outcome
Claimed US $250 million
in damages.
Settled with Ethyl for US
$13 million.

Claimed US $20 million
in damages.
S.D. Meyers awarded US
$5 million by UNCITRAL
panel for Canada’s breach
of Articles 1102 and 1105.
Canada’s appeal of the
decision to the federal
court was dismissed.

Sun Belt
NoI:
Dec. 2, 1998
NoA:
Oct. 12, 1999

1102
1103
1105

U.S. water company
challenged British
Columbia’s water
protection legislation and
bulk water export
moratorium

Claimed US $10.5 billion.
Arbitration never began.

308

The information in this table has been primarily reproduced with the permission of the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTS., NAFTA CHAPTER
DISPUTES
(Oct.
1,
2010),
available
at
11
INVESTOR-STATE
www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2010/11/NAF
TA%20Dispute%20Table.pdf; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, TABLE OF FOREIGN INVESTOR–STATE
CASES AND CLAIMS UNDER NAFTA AND OTHER U.S. TRADE DEALS 6-13 (Mar. 2013), available at
www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.
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Chemtura
Corp.
NoI:
Nov. 6, 2001

1103
1105
1110

NoA:
Feb. 10, 2005

V.G. Gallo
NoI:
Oct. 12, 2006

1105
1110

NoA:
Mar. 30, 2007

Clayton/Bilcon
NoI:
Feb. 5, 2008

1102
1103
1105

NoA:
May 26, 2008

Dow Chemical
NoI:
Aug. 25, 2008
NoA:
Mar. 31, 2009
Malbaie Rivers
Outfitters Inc.
NoI:
Sep. 16, 2008
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1105
1110

1102
1103
1105
1110

U.S. chemical company,
Chemtura Corp.
(previously Crompton
Corp.), claim against
voluntary agreement
between manufacturers
and the federal
government to ban the
sale and use of the
pesticide lindane.

Gallo alleged that
proposed Ontario
legislation affected his
investment in a proposed
landfill on the site of a
decommissioned openpit iron ore mine, Adams
Mine.
Bilcon is challenging a
joint federal-provincial
environmental
assessment panel
recommendation that
reject a quarry and
marine terminal in Nova
Scotia because of
adverse environmental
impacts.
Dow AgroSciences
challenged Québec’s ban
on the use of the
pesticide 2,4-D.

Malbaie challenged
Québec’s conservation
measures of reducing
fishing licenses and
restricting access to
certain fishing areas.

51

Claimed US $79 million
in damages.
Claim dismissed by
UNCITRAL panel
ordering the investor to
pay the costs of the
arbitration (US $688,000)
and to pay fifty percent of
Canada’s costs in
defending the claim (CAD
$5.778 million).
Claimed CAD $355.1
million in damages
UNCITRAL dismissed
application for lack of
jurisdiction.
Tribunal awarded Canada
US $450,000 in costs.
Claimed US $188 million
in damages.
Claim still pending.

Claimed US $2 million in
damages.
Settled at no cost.

Claimed US $5 million in
damages.
Settled after payment of
an undisclosed amount.
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David Bishop
NoI:
Oct. 17, 2008

AbitibiBowater
NoI:
Apr. 23, 2009

1102
1103
1104
1105
1110

1102
1103
1105
1110

NoA:
Feb. 25, 2010
John R. Andre
NoI:
Mar. 19, 2010

St. Mary’s
VCNA, LLC
NoI:
May 13, 2011

1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1110
1102
1103
1105
1110

NoA:
Sep. 14, 2011
Lone Pine
Resources Inc.
NoI:
Nov. 8, 2012

1105
1110

Mesa Power
Group LLC
NoI:
July 6, 2011

1102
1103
1104
1105
1106

NoA:
Oct. 4, 2011

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol7/iss1/4

Bishop challenged
Québec’s conservation
measures of reducing the
number of fishing
licenses and restricting
access to certain fishing
areas.
The Newfoundland
Government enacted
legislation to return to
public control Abitibi’s
water and timber rights,
and to expropriate certain
lands and assets.
Andre challenged
conservation measures
taken by the Northwest
Territories to decrease
the number of caribou
that can be hunted.
St. Mary’s challenged
Ontario and municipal
land use planning and
licensing approval
processes affecting St.
Mary’s proposals to
develop agricultural land
into an aggregate quarry.
Lone Pine is challenging
Québec’s 2011
moratorium on shale
fracturing (“fracking”) in
certain environmentally
sensitive areas.
A Texas-based
renewable energy
development company
challenged the Ontario
Power Authority’s
changes to the rules for
awarding contracts under
the FIT Program.

[Vol. 7

Claimed US $1 million in
damages.
Claim still pending.

Claimed US $467.5
million in damages.
Settled for US $130
million, the largest
NAFTA related monetary
settlement to date.
Claimed US $5.6 million
in damages.
Claim still pending.

Claimed US $275 million
in damages.
Settled after Province of
Ontario paid US $15
million.

Claiming CAD $250
million in damages.
Claim still pending.

Claiming US $775 million
in damages.
Claim still pending.
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Windstream
Energy
NoI:
Oct. 17, 2012
NoA:
Jan. 28, 2013

1110
1105
1102

A U.S.-owned wind
energy company is
challenging Ontario’s
2011 moratorium on
offshore wind
development partly based
on a need for further
scientific research to
determine the impact on
health and the
environment.

53

Claiming US
$475,230,000 in damages.
Claim still pending.

Legend:
NoI = Notice of Intent to File an Arbitration
NoA = Notice of Arbitration
Article 1110 = Expropriation and Compensation
Article 1106 = Performance Requirements
Article 1105 = Minimum Standard of Treatment
Article 1104 = Standard of Treatment
Article 1103 = Most Favored-Nation Treatment
Article 1102 = National Treatment
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